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DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE CROSS-SECTORAL LINKAGES ZAMBIA CASE STUDY

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFR/SD/DG	Africa Bureau/Sustainable Development/Democracy and Governance Division
AOTR	Agreement Officer's Technical Representative
ATI	Appropriate Technologies International
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CAC	Cooperative Agreement Committee
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDIE	Center for Development Information and Evaluation
CEL	Country Experimental Laboratory
CLUSA	Cooperative League of USA
COTR	Contract Officer Technical Representative
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
DG	Democracy and Governance
DH	Direct Hire
DHRF	Democracy and Human Rights Fund
DTF	District Task Force
FSN	Foreign Service National
FY	Fiscal Year
G/DG	Global/Democracy and Governance
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mali
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IQC	Indefinite Quantity Contract
IR	Intermediate Result
LFSPPH	Livingstone Food Security Project Phase II
MOH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NPA	Nonproject Assistance
NRM	Natural Resources Management
OYB	Obligated Yearly Budget
PCI	Project Concern International
PHN	Population Health and Nutrition
PSC	Personal Services Contractor
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RFP	Request For Proposal
RPM	Results Package Manager
R4	Results Review & Resource Request
SEG	Sustainable Economic Growth
SO	Strategic Objective
SOT	Strategic Objective Team
SPO	Special Objective
TNC	Third Country National
USIS	United States Information Service
VAG	Village Area Group
VMC	Village Management Group

STUDY BACKGROUND AND METHODS

The Zambia study is one of a series of case studies that the Democracy and Governance Division of the Africa Bureau's Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD/DG) is undertaking to develop a knowledge base of best practices adopted by Missions integrating democracy and governance program elements and principles into their activities in other Agency goal areas.

These studies are being conducted in collaboration with—and are expected to contribute to—similar democracy and governance cross-sectoral linkages studies being undertaken by USAID's Center for Development Information and Evaluation and the Global Bureau's Democracy and Governance Office.

The studies present examples in the context of host country political and economic developments, Mission resources, and recent Mission institutional history. They identify actions Missions have taken to promote integration, as well as challenges Missions face in promoting greater linkages. The studies also describe positive field impacts that have resulted from cross-sectoral integration.

The Zambia case study highlights sectoral activities that have been expanded to address the institutional and political context, independent of the Mission's democracy and governance strategic objective.

Field work was conducted during November 1998, by a three-member team composed of Dr. Dana Ott, AFR/SD/DG; Anne O'Toole Salinas, Africa Bureau Information Center (ABIC), R&RS Project; and Dr. David M. Miller, a consultant.

I. OVERVIEW: COUNTRY EXPERIENCE

Unlike other cases that form part of the study (such as Mali), government in Zambia is not rapidly liberalizing and decentralizing, and the unresolved character of the political context has influenced the Zambia Mission program. Government strong-arm tactics prior to the 1996 national elections, and an apparent weakening of commitment to democratic transformation, compelled the Mission to reconsider its approach to democracy and governance (DG), and weave flexibility into its strategic plan. At present, the Mission is cautious about identifying DG activities and opportunities for the integration of the DG strategic objective (SO) resources into the activities of their other SOs.

The DG SO currently funds one primary activity, a grant to improve NGO capacity for advocacy. Other activities have been planned in which DG will collaborate with other SOs in capital city based, or national-level activities. Most important for this study, however, is the number of successful community-level activities that integrate DG elements into sectoral projects independently of support, either technical or financial, from the DG SO. Despite national-level challenges on the road to democratic transition, the current political climate does not appear to hinder such institutional activities at the local level. The Country Strategic Plan leaves open the possibility of DG SO support to these activities, and ongoing studies may clarify possibilities for the Mission.

The Zambia Mission's portfolio contains a number of efforts promoting local institutional capacity building in which democracy and governance "program elements and principles"¹ have been integrated into a sectoral activity. The health SO has child survival and HIV/AIDS activities working at the community level. The economic growth SO has agriculture, wildlife, and rural credit activities, primarily implemented by PVOs and NGOs, filling the vacuum where the government has recognized it lacks the capacity to meet the demand for public services. In each of the three cases presented in this report, an SO, independent of the DG SO, has supported a PVO project incorporating governance aspects. According to Mission and project staff, the approach has improved activity efficiency and sustainability. These sectoral activities have contributed to changes in Zambia's political culture by strengthening civil society, increasing citizen experience with the principles of democratic governance, and providing examples of new ways of governing.

II. HOST COUNTRY CONTEXT

In a pattern followed in many African countries, Zambia saw its high post-independence hopes for economic take-off crushed in two short decades. The country then undertook vast IMF-guided economic restructuring in the latter half of the 1980s, and inaugurated a multi-party electoral system in

¹ Principles of democratic governance include: promoting citizen participation in government decision making and priority setting; and building the capacity of civil society groups to advocate for needed services, monitor and provide feedback on the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, and help increase the demand for government transparency and accountability.

the early 1990s. Elections held in 1991 made Zambia the first Anglophone state in post-colonial Africa to embark upon a process of democratic transition.

High hopes and positive changes accompanied the shift in regimes. The media and NGOs grew in strength, and the judiciary began to play a more important role within the government. However, multi-party elections do not by themselves usher in a new political culture. In the early 1990s, the government responded to prolonged civil unrest by detaining opposition leaders without trial, and in 1993, called a state of emergency. The absence of new values became even more apparent in the intensified maneuvering prior to the 1996 national elections. In its most conspicuous ploy, the government enacted constitutional amendments barring the President Frederick Chiluba's strongest rival from the race. As a result, the U.S. government reduced support to Zambia, and the Mission rethought its democracy and governance program. In the years since President Frederick Chiluba's re-election, Zambia has seen significant public protest against the government, the shooting of two political leaders, and the incarceration of two prominent political opponents of the president. In October 1997, a state of emergency was imposed after a failed coup attempt, and over 90 persons were detained without trial.

Continuing tensions in the current political scene limit the range of potential USAID involvement by broadening the definition of activities perceived as political. The U.S. government mission is sensitive to this definition, and avoids activities—principally on the national level—that might provoke the charge of support for opposition parties. Sensitivities also resulted from prior USAID support for political liberalization through certain national NGOs, which continues to influence the Mission's choice of approaches and partners. While the December 1997 Country Strategic Plan (CSP) proposes work on virtually all aspects of governance in Zambia, actual activities the Mission has begun to undertake are more limited.

The unresolved character of the political context has influenced the Mission program and obliged a certain openness in the CSP. Government in Zambia is not rapidly liberalizing or decentralizing—developments that would implicate all sectoral activities. Nor does government repress all sectors of society—developments that would limit sectoral involvement in institutional issues. Even among Mission staff, different individuals characterize the political context differently, and have views ranging from guarded confidence to flat cynicism.

One of the domains USAID has strongly targeted for concerted support is the government's decentralization program. Economic decline since the 1980s has resulted in a deterioration of the amount of resources flowing from the center to local level government agencies, which in effect created a de facto centralization of formal government authority. After the 1991 elections, certain progress was made on the decentralization front. Legislation was drafted, and a decentralization act passed. The Ministry of Health, which has been on the forefront of administrative decentralization, has deconcentrated certain responsibilities out of the capital and supported increased community involvement in the provision of health services.

Mission efforts in decentralization will face challenges, however. Recent decisions within the Zambian government appear to be stalling, if not nullifying, steps taken towards health sector reform thus far. On the legislative front, the decentralization act has been pending in the Cabinet since 1995. These setbacks have led some observers to question the government's will to execute a thorough program of decentralization.

In addition to supporting administrative deconcentration in Zambia's ministries, the Mission is also going to work with the judiciary on arbitration and mediation mechanisms. The DG SO currently funds one activity: a grant to promote responsible advocacy on the part of civil society organizations and conduct research on how to make DG relevant to people's basic needs.

Outside of the DG SO, the Mission supports a number of community activities that integrate DG elements into sectoral projects. Despite national-level challenges on the road to democratic transition, no one—not Mission staff, the staff of partner organizations, nor donor representatives—reported that the current political climate hinders the integration of democracy and governance aspects into sectoral activities at the local level. The current political context does not limit the geographic expansion of activities promoting a more democratic political culture. Most informants even agreed that efforts could be pushed beyond the current focus on community development to political activities, such as teaching democratic and transparent management or advocacy. At the local level, the political context hinders increased DG integration only to the extent that donors make the strategic decision to apply funds to more critical issues elsewhere.

III. THE MISSION CONTEXT FOR SYNERGY

Strategic Objectives

To achieve its goal of more Zambians benefiting from the reforms of the 1990s, the Mission has established four strategic objectives:

- ? **Strategic Objective 1** – Economic Growth: *Increased sustainable rural incomes*
- ? **Strategic Objective 2** – Basic Education: *More equitable access to quality basic education and learning especially for girls*
- ? **Strategic Objective 3** – Integrated Health: *Increased use of integrated child and reproductive health and HIV/AIDS interventions*
- ? **Strategic Objective 4** – Democracy and Governance: *Expanded opportunity for effective participation in democratic governance*

Strategic Team Organization

Workload may determine the amount of time and energy Mission personnel have available to address innovative strategies, such as cross-SO planning. This may be a factor in the Zambia Mission's story,

yet more data would be necessary to make a comparative study of personnel to management unit or personnel to budget ratios.

Absolute staff size has an impact, as does as the ratio of foreign service nationals (FSNs), third country nationals (TCNs), and U. S. personnel service contractors (PSC), to U.S. direct hires (DHs). Both may influence the stability of teams and the potential for teams to work together smoothly. PSCs and FSNs continue to work in Missions, while direct hires rotate out every few years. A strong FSN staff not only provides institutional memory, but may influence Mission working dynamic and inter-office coordination.

USAID Zambia's strategic objective teams consist of no more than six people. Of the total of 14 members, the four with the most decision-making authority (29 percent) will "rotate out" within three years. Such high member turn over poses a serious challenge to smooth team functioning.

The small size of the Mission's staff may be one of the reasons why SO teams have yet to become a dynamic factor in Mission management. Staff reported that in the early stages of reengineering, the Mission experimented with creating very large SO teams, but these proved to be too cumbersome. SO teams have since been slimmed down to include only core staff members.

Currently, the DG SO team consists of the DG advisor, the DG SO specialist, and representatives from the economic growth sector, the comptroller's office, and two from the program office. No one from either the integrated health sector or the executive office sits on the DG SO team. The DG advisor also serves as a member of the economic growth team. Members of the health team sit on no other teams, and no members from other sectors sit on their team.

In addition to developing, monitoring, and managing activities for the DG SO, the current DG advisor, who arrived in September of 1997, also advises the Mission and the U.S. Embassy on current political developments. He has also played an important role in the programming of the joint USAID-Department of State Democracy and Human Rights Fund (DHRF) monies.

Origin and Activities of the DG SO

In the atmosphere leading up to and following the problematic 1996 elections, the Mission decided to radically change its DG strategy. The first set of DG SO activities, which began in 1992-93, were designed to encourage a smooth transition to democratic governance, and focused primarily on the national level processes and institutions feeding into the electoral process. The SO supported NGO work on civil rights, civic education, and free and fair elections. Forty civic education NGOs implemented grassroots programs encouraging citizens to register, vote, and seek accountability from their representatives. Unfortunately, any Mission expectations that transition to democracy would be either smooth or steady evaporated with governmental machinations prior to the elections. Most frustrating may have been the invalidation of the candidacy of the president's strongest opponent. During this same period, the civil society organizations the Mission had supported proved largely unable to work constructively with the government.

Because it has recently been recast, the DG SO supported only one major activity at the time the study team was in the field, a grant to the U.S. PVO PACT. The DG SO co-finance this grant with the integrated health SO. Under the grant, in which the integrated health and DG SOs fund distinct activities, DG supports advocacy training to NGOs and research on how to make DG relevant to the basic needs of individuals. Other activities the DG SO intends to fund in the near future include: support for a combined alternative dispute resolution (ADR) activity, work with the Parliament and local government, and an Internet information and communication activity (through the Leland Initiative) related to decentralization in the Ministry of Health, working together with the health SO.

In addition to the activities of the DG SO, the Mission supports a large number of local level activities that take a community development or local institutional approach to achieving results. The DG SO isn't currently structured to support these activities, though, as is discussed below, the strategy leaves that possibility open.

Synergy in the Country Strategic Plan

The December 1997 CSP presents the strategic objectives in the context of the country's changing political landscape, and notes governance issues in each of the results frameworks. While the main text does not present synergy as a dominant theme, and scarcely notes links among SOs, the annexes reveal plans for joint SO support on a number of issues and activities. These plans are open for further definition and contain the possibility for a wide range of SO synergies between the DG SO and the rest of the Mission's portfolio.

SO 1 Economic Growth, identifies several activities that could include governance program elements or principles, such as the continuation of privatization efforts; trade policy adjustments; and dispute resolution mechanisms. Intermediate Result (IR) 1.3.2, *Reduced Cost of Commercial Contract Conformity*, presents the Mission's prime example of structured inter-SO collaboration with DG. The development of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms is "emblematic of democratic governance." The DG team will take the lead on this activity, with close support from the SO 1 team. For its part, the first sub-IR in the DG IR 4.1.1, *Improved Legal Framework for More Effective Functioning of Free Markets*, consists of a description of the ADR activity.

When possible, the CSP highlights the DG nature of national-level activities. For example, it asserts that efforts to improve the enabling environment, such as trade policy adjustments, are inherently governance activities. On the other hand, the DG nature of community level activities is not reflected in the text, nor reflected in indicators. SO1 measures results at the level of the individual, or within the private sector. It does not measure local institutional capacity growth or reform of civil society or governmental institutions. Results include farmer adoption of new technologies (IR 1.1), and growth among the country's small and medium enterprises (IR 1.2). IR 1.3 focuses on the enabling environment.

SO 2 Basic Education, also proposes to work on a number of issues closely related to governance, such as community empowerment, and local planning. The SO will potentially support communities and NGOs. IR 2.2, *Successful Implementation of Private-Sector/Community Programs Supporting*

Quality Girls' Basic Education, includes activities to strengthen parent participation in PTAs. Although the CSP identifies no specific activities on which both basic education and DG SO teams will coordinate, it does note the importance of education in promoting democratic governance. (As discussed below, IR 2.3, *Improved Policy and Planning Capacity at the Ministry of Education*, may be achieved with input from the DG SO team. As it stands, this IR describes a technical sectoral activity to improve enrollment rates and attendance; the nature of impact on governance is not defined.)

SO 3 Integrated Health, incorporates a large measure of support to improved governance in the health sector. Nationally, this SO intersects with DG through the government's program for decentralization of the ministry, and the health team will coordinate closely with the DG SO team on these activities. IR 3.5, *Improved Policies, Planning and Support Systems for PHN Interventions*, supports the institutional and decentralization priorities of the Ministry of Health.

Activities were initially planned to also target local level institutional issues such as local health sector planning, implementation and accountability. Under IR 3.2, *Increased Delivery of PHN Interventions at the Community Level*, the Mission planned to support the creation of partnerships between health centers and local communities, and the formation of neighborhood health committees. Due to unforeseen changes at the Ministry of Health (new minister), these proposed initiatives are currently on hold.

The CSP underscores governance and institutional considerations to achieving the integrated health SO, and commits the SO to work with the DG team. But collaboration, with the exception of the joint activity through PACT, is not developed to the point that either the integrated health SO or the DG SO identify specific activities to be conducted jointly.

SO 4 Democracy and Governance, will work in conjunction with all other SO teams. The section on synergies states that DG will support the decentralization efforts of both the respective ministries of basic education and integrated health. The mechanics of this collaboration were not worked out at the time the CSP was drafted, however. In fact, collaboration on decentralization is not mentioned in the Basic Education Results Framework. Nor is it mentioned in the DG Framework itself, unless the Ministry of Education is chosen as the pilot ministry mentioned in IR 4.3.1, *Improved Administration, Planning, and Budgeting*. (But in that case, the DG Framework does not identify results to be achieved in collaboration with integrated health SO.)

Democracy and Governance was designed at a time of political uncertainty, when the Mission was looking for a new approach. Intermediate Result 4.3.1, *Improved Administration, Planning, and Budgeting*, will be implemented in coordination with the Mission's other SO teams, through a pilot initiative involving a GRZ line ministry..." The line ministry is not specified. Possibilities for collaboration are also to be found, but not articulated, in two of the sub-IRs.

IR 4.2.3 *Effective Advocacy by Civil Society Organizations Representing Diverse Interests*, presents four activities through which USAID will support civil society organizations. It does not specify a specific category of civil society organizations the Mission intends to target. IR 4.2.4 *Citizen*

Awareness of the Relevance of Democratic Governance to Basic Needs is also broadly defined and has the potential for being achieved through activities developed in conjunction with another SO.

IV. ACTIONS THE MISSION HAS TAKEN TO PROMOTE SYNERGY

Daily Context for Integration

While people in the different SOs do meet and talk, and sometimes discuss working together, the Mission culture is not charged with the idea of promoting synergies. It appears that the Mission has decided that, given the factors involved—mission resources, host country context, geographic distribution of activities, staff dynamics—aggressively promoting synergy is not within its manageable interest. The benefits of promoting synergies, given the management costs, are not always apparent.

Beyond the joint activities mentioned in Section III D (Synergy in the Country Strategic Plan) above, and the presence of the DG advisor on the economic growth SO team, the study team was able to identify one example of DG SO team contribution to decision-making in other SOs. The DG advisor regularly reviews unsolicited proposals received by the economic growth SO. The proposals, received from PVOs, generally concern community development activities. After these review meetings, the DG advisor has no further contact with the activities.

Structured Collaboration

The alternative dispute resolution activity currently being planned is a strongly collaborative activity, engaging both funds and technical support from the economic growth and DG SOs. The preparatory activities conducted so far—a number of seminars in September of 1998—were financed under the economic growth SO. Further activities—training, public relations activities, and possibly an ADR center—are expected to be financed by the DG SO. (At the time of the study team's visit, a grant engaging DG SO funds was expected to be signed in January 1999. This did indeed happen.) DG team members work with and provide technical advice concerning the legal community, while the economic growth team's privatization expert works with the business community. In addition to increasing the effectiveness of the judiciary branch through mediation activities, the activity is expected to assist the business community through commercial arbitration, which will contribute to both economic growth and DG results.

While the Mission has supported the collaboration between SOs that has been necessary to produce the ADR activity, the activity did not originate with the intention of inter-SO synergy. In fact, the activity was initially conceived outside of the Mission with a USIS officer's efforts to promote mediation. As described by the Mission, economic growth became involved because a member of the economic growth team had been invited to sit on the DG SO because of her knowledge of Zambia and of the activities of the previous DG advisor. As noted in Section III B (Strategic Team Organization), cross-sitting on SOs is not a standard Mission practice. When the idea of mediation was raised, it was realized that economic growth SO would be able to fund the initial seminars through an existing economic growth privatization activity if they included commercial arbitration.

Elsewhere, the health information activity, still in planning stages, is also shaping up to be an example of structured collaboration between SOs. The objective of the activity, as it is now imagined, is to help Zambia develop a two way information system for use by the Ministry of Health to collect statistics from the localities as well as make information, such as drug availability, available throughout the country. DG funds would be used for the preliminary studies. The activity itself would be supported through health SO funds (along with funds from other donors such as Denmark). The intention would be to produce results in both sectors by contributing to the cross-cutting goal of decentralization.

The one activity the DG SO currently finances is executed through a grant jointly financed with the integrated health SO. It is, nevertheless, not an example of structured collaboration between two SOs. The cooperative agreement (CA) with PACT has two components, one financed by the health SO and one by the DG SO. The components were independently conceived and developed. While the CA has only one contracting officer's technical representative (COTR)—a member of the health team—he deals only with contractual issues relating to the CA. Substantive issues relating to the DG activities are addressed by the DG SO team. (Ironically, while the two activities are separated under the grant, there is much overlap in their substance. The integrated health component of the grant addresses a number of DG issues and promotes the institutional development of civil society organizations. For its part, the DG component is intended to facilitate Mission work in other sectors. It promotes advocacy by a range of civil society actors and explores how DG can become more relevant to basic needs.)

V. CONSTRAINTS AND SUGGESTIONS

When interviewed, many members of the Zambia Mission staff expressed the belief that increased cross-SO collaboration in the Mission could be a good thing. Many also strongly supported the idea of increased integration of DG program elements and principles into sectoral activities. Staff reported having had ideas for working with other SO teams, or possible ways sectoral activities could be strengthened through increased focus on governance aspects. They also report having gone as far as discussing such ideas with other members of the Mission. Some even mentioned actions they should take, such as visits to the sites of projects outside of their SO. Synergy and planning cross-cutting activities are being discussed in the Mission, and they played a role in the discussions of the Country Strategy Plan.

In this section, we present reasons given by the Zambian Mission staff for why so few of these initiatives bear fruit. We also present their suggestions of ways to achieve greater inter-SO collaboration.

Too Busy: The most commonly presented explanation of why staff members did not spend more time developing cross-sectoral activities was that they lack the time to do so. Both the small size of the staff, and time consuming reporting requirements from Washington were identified as factors in keeping staff schedules busy.

Small Mission Size: The small size of the Mission increases staff workloads for a number of reasons. First, no contracting officer has been assigned to work in Lusaka, and performing contractual work

takes longer as a result. Second, the small Mission is unable to out-source tasks such as results monitoring or certain aspects of contract management.

In addition to absolute Mission size, staff/operating year budget and staff/management unit ratios are also important. Direct hire to PSC and FSN ratios also influence the landscape of management burden. On the other hand, small staff numbers may make cross-SO activities less cumbersome to develop. If individual staff members develop effective working relationships, a small staff can work more informally and smoothly than a large bureaucratic Mission.

Low Priority: The fact that the Mission staff is too busy to work on cross-sectoral activities is also a reflection of the priority such activities have been given in the Mission. While everyone in the Mission, from the director on down, expressed support for cross-sectoral integration, inter-SO collaboration has not received sufficient support to put it on the top of people's agendas.

Demand: Although Agency guidance supports Mission development of integrated programs, synergy is but one of many objectives competing for Mission management attention. A Mission director presenting his Mission's CSP or R4 (Results Review & Resource Request) in Washington finds no clear constituency for synergy. Although there was support for the use of funds from the economic growth SO for the alternative dispute resolution activity under the DG SO, often missions get the message from USAID Washington that sectoral funds should be used for activities that could clearly be identified as belonging to that sector.

New Ground: There is little guidance facilitating efforts to integrate DG program elements and principles into other sectors. The Agency has few examples to present to a Mission attempting to do this. To the extent that they have been implemented, multi-sector activities have primarily been developed by individual technical offices.

Earmarking: Congressional limitation of funds to specific uses reinforces tunnel vision. The Mission considers its budget with the idea that certain portions will be applied to specific ends. This creates a stovepiping bias in the thinking from the outset. Funds are more likely to be conceived of in isolation as monies for a particular SO, and not for the Mission as a whole. More concretely, staff is aware that the Mission could be charged with the misuse of funds if it too broadly interprets congressional earmarks.

Unpredictable Funding: The independent streams of funding created by earmarking also increases the risk of developing activities dependant upon joint funding. While a Mission may meet the challenge of absorbing a large increase of funds into a jointly funded activity, a sudden drop in funds from one source could decrease results in both SOs. A health SO team, for example, may resist funding an activity with child survival if results are dependent upon continued joint funding with unpredictable DG funds.

Reporting by Strategic Objective: In addition to being time-consuming, Mission staff also noted that reporting requirements, and in particular the R4 process, reinforce a mentality of addressing SOs independently of one another. Missions often develop their CSPs and then they develop their SOs in a

stovepipe manner. They identify synergies as an afterthought, if at all. In Washington, presentations are reviewed sector by sector, for the most part, with questions limited to issues in the specific technical sector being reviewed at the time.

Results Focus: Agency and Mission definitions of what appropriate results should look like influence the types of activities SO teams develop. Insistence on short term measurable results and individual level impact indicators decreases the likelihood that SO teams will develop activities that take on the challenge of integrating governance issues into sectoral activities. Sectoral work with local government institutions or civil society organizations, such as participatory or community development approaches, often promises to be a long process, with few dramatic results in the short term. An insistence on short time frames for results discourages this type of development activity, which must go through a process of information sharing, negotiation, and consensus building among large groups of people before having “people level” impact.

The constraint of short time frames on the achievement of results may be mitigated by the use of indicators targeting changes in institutions or organizations. It is reasonable to expect an SO to achieve measurable results within two years if the activity is measured through institutional process results, such as the creation, modification, or strengthening of a particular organization or institution. However, it is less likely if the Mission, with support from Washington, has defined sectoral results in terms of impacts on individuals, such as improved low rainfall farm production or increased demand for PHN interventions among target groups.

High Staff Turnover: Teamwork takes time to develop, and inter-team collaboration is difficult if not impossible to maintain when critical team members leave for a new post after two, three, or four years. Collaboration is also weakened by the absence of significant numbers of permanent staff members to provide institutional memory and continue behaviors that encourage interaction.

Sectoral Specialists: Mission staff, particularly direct hire employees, have for the most part received their training in a single sector; many have spent their careers working only in that sector. This both limits their technical capacity to create joint-SO activities and creates the habits and perspective of a single sector approach.

Suggestions

When asked how the Zambia Mission might encourage greater integration of DG principles and program elements into the activities of other sectors, the study team was presented with the following suggestions:

Start Early: Mission staff stressed the importance of fostering collaboration from the beginning in the development of the strategic plan, the design of strategic objectives, and the conceptualization of activities.

Increase Staff Interaction: Synergy would be increased if the Mission helped promote a greater number of informal occasions during which staff could get together, socialize, and share ideas.

Improve Information Sharing: Mission staff proposed that a system of information sharing be developed that would increase awareness among SO teams of activities being developed and implemented by other SOs. One possibility would be secondary meetings following the senior staff meetings.

Provide Technical Assistance: Mission staff suggested that technical assistance be provided by USAID Washington to assist the Mission with the integration of DG program elements and principles into the activities of other sectors.

Provide Proof: It was also suggested that evidence of the effectiveness of DG synergies would be useful in motivating the Mission to develop integrated activities.

VI. FIELD LEVEL IMPACTS

The Zambia Mission's portfolio contains a number of efforts promoting local institutional capacity building in which democracy and governance program elements and principles have been integrated into a sectoral activity. The integrated health SO has child survival and HIV/AIDS activities working at the community level. The economic growth SO has agriculture, wildlife, and rural credit activities—primarily implemented by PVOs and NGOs—filling the vacuum where the government has recognized it lacks the capacity to meet the demand for public services.

Three such activities are presented below. In each case an SO—independent of the DG SO—has supported a PVO project incorporating governance aspects. According to Mission and project staff, the approach has improved activity efficiency and sustainability. These sectoral activities have also begun to change Zambia's political culture. They have strengthened civil society, increased citizen experience with the principles of democratic governance, and provided examples of new ways of governing.

Livingstone Food Security Project, Phase II (LFSPPII)

The Livingstone Food Security Project, Phase II (1996-2000) reflects an evolution in the method experienced many PVOs in the past 10 years. Conceived initially as a drought relief and food for work activity (Phase I), the Livingstone Food Security Project has recently integrated local institutional capacity building into its approach (Phase II). Like Phase I, the goal of Phase II remains food security—sustainable increases in farm production and income. However, CARE recognized that a number of social and institutional factors must be carefully addressed in order to reach that goal. (In fact, in the project paper building institutional capacity is a goal alongside raising incomes.)

Working in drought-prone areas, LFSPPII helps rural communities organize village management committees (VMC) composed of solidarity groups of four to seven people. The core activity of each group is to multiply and loan low-rainfall seed. The VMCs have proven sufficiently successful that they have taken on other responsibilities, and now perform extension and technical training, test new

technologies, introduce new crops, manage saving schemes, assist in marketing and water management activities, and support small agriculturally-based enterprises.

CARE has shifted away from the relief approach believing that over the long term, targeting changes in farming systems and building local institutional capacity to plan and manage those systems is more cost effective. Intensive short-term project management is offset by reduced long-term farmer dependence on outside assistance. According to the director of CARE Zambia, Kevin McCort, the primary benefit gained from a community participation approach is ownership.

By increasing ownership, the new approach has increased project efficiency in at least two ways: 1) CARE has mobilized previously underutilized local resources to provide of public services. The members of the community groups have taken on certain planning, communication, seed production, and distribution functions that were formerly the responsibility of extension agents and project personnel. 2) Working through local organizations has increased farmer participation in technical decisions. Local time- and place-specific knowledge is invaluable to the effective development and adoption of appropriate technologies.

In addition to improving activity implementation, the new approach also achieves governance results. Not only does LFSPPII increase the number of civil society organizations—and thus give citizens greater opportunity to express and address their concerns through organized bodies—but it also creates opportunities for people to learn and apply the principles of democratic management. VMCs receive management training to ensure efficient, participatory, and democratic leadership. Members are provided the opportunity to practice new methods of organization while addressing their basic needs.

Project Concern International (PCI)

The PCI activity has evolved from a traditional institution strengthening effort to a program fostering partnerships among a wide range of civil society and public sector partners. The core of the PCI HIV/AIDS activity is the organization, training, and support of new inter-sectoral service provision bodies. To improve and expand the provision of services, PCI has supported the creation of district task forces (DTF) to develop and implement HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation activities. Representatives from NGOs, churches, the military, and several ministries contribute their resources to activities confronting the national pandemic. The DTFs are an innovative response to the recognition that the government, working as it did in the past, was unable to address the mounting national health crisis. Broadening the PCI activity from a technical/administrative approach has enabled the mobilization and refocusing of resources. Like LFSPPII, the PCI activity draws underutilized resources to address public needs. It also increases government responsiveness. By working together with churches, NGOs, the military, and others, the Ministry of Health becomes more aware of the needs of a wider range of clients.

But perhaps more importantly, the PCI activity promotes new relationships among civil society actors and government. One of the principal challenges the project initially faced was to get representatives of NGOs and ministries to work together well. Successful DTFs enable partners to coordinate strengths

and profit from the synergy of their efforts. NGOs and churches contribute their outreach and mobilization resources; Ministry of Health officials contribute technical expertise. Some partners provide the halls for meetings; some provide chairs. Through PCI's efforts, they have together implemented activities and managed grant programs. In this collaboration, Ministry of Health officials are learning and practicing a new role—that of facilitator and collaborator. PCI hopes that the DTFs, which are currently being implemented in five districts, will serve as a model of a new way of governing to the entire country.

Administrative Management Design Project (ADMADE)

As is the case with many natural resources management activities in Africa, the Administrative Management Design project was designed based on the conclusion that effective public service provision requires close attention to governance issues. Improved management of resources over which the public shares control requires the development of institutions that facilitate government and public co-management of these resources. Consequently, ADMADE has supported the process of building local organizations to fill the vacuum left by government's withdrawal from the management of wildlife facilities during the liberalization program in the early 1990s. Through village area groups (VAGs), local communities help manage local wildlife areas and raise funds to address local public needs through the controlled sale of tourist and hunting rights.

Impacts on public service delivery are numerous and varied. The approach has mobilized local resources: VAGs now perform many of the functions that were previously the responsibilities of the wildlife ministry and district governments. It has also improved incentives and participation and community members now work more effectively to control poaching. ADMADE has also popularized new ways of governing. Through the VAGs, communities gain experience in self-organization, the management of funds, and how to interact with the government and tourists. The project has also strengthened civil society. Some of the VAGs have become federated and have begun to advocate for community needs.

This local level activity has even served to influence the development of national policy. The Zambia Wildlife Act, passed in 1998, introduces mechanisms to empower all communities to manage local natural resources as they have been in the ADMADE areas through special arrangement. This act sets an example and may create new expectations for the realignment of responsibilities between government and civil society in other sectors as well. It also serves as an example for donors, the government, and the country as a whole when considering options for decentralization.

ANNEX 1: ZAMBIA MISSION STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

SO 1 Economic Growth

Result: Increased Sustainable Rural Incomes

The purpose of this eight-year SO, initiated in FY 1995, is to reduce the state's role in the provision of goods and services more efficiently produced by the private sector; and to increase the efficiency and productive capacity of rural nonfarm enterprises. The public sector activities of this SO include support for organizations lobbying for privatization of utilities, the implementation of trade protocols with neighboring countries, and the provision of training and services to strengthen new and newly privatized companies. Through this SO, USAID also helps small-holder agriculturists. The Mission supports business development, marketing enterprises, and savings mobilization activities as well as village-based natural resources management and food security programs.

SO 2 Basic Education²

Result: More equitable access to quality basic education and learning, especially for girls

Under this SO the Mission plans to support three components: 1) improving health and educational performance of primary school age girls; 2) improving capacities at decentralized levels to develop plans and strategies to improve girls' education; and 3) improving policy, planning, implementation, and performance monitoring systems at the central ministry.

Initial SO2 activities are expected to begin in 1999.

SO 3 Integrated Health

Result: Increased Use of Integrated Child and Reproductive Health and HIV/AIDS Interventions

The purpose of this seven-year SO, initiated in 1995, is to improve delivery of decentralized integrated health services. Under this SO, the Mission supports the implementation of an integrated primary childhood diseases program; expansion of private sector essential health service delivery; and a national Vitamin A strategy. It supports activities expanding contraceptive diversity and accessibility; a Men's Involvement in Reproductive Health Initiative; multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS support strategies; improved HIV/AIDS policies and programs and decentralized strategic planning; and efforts to address adolescent access to critical information. Also included are activities to improve the quality of life of orphaned/vulnerable children, primarily through the expansion of the service delivery through NGOs and community-based organizations.

² This description of SO 2 is derived from the CSP.

SO 4 Democracy and Governance

Result: Expanded Opportunity for Effective Participation in Democratic Governance

The purpose of this seven-year SO, initiated in 1995, is to increase the participation in and transparency and accountability of government institutions. The goals of USAID's program in democracy and governance in Zambia are: 1) to achieve government accountability; 2) to assure that public decisions are accessible and effective; 3) to support the role of privately owned media; and 4) to encourage the conduct of free and fair elections. Specific activities were being redesigned in FY 1998. USAID will continue to support civil society NGOs in their work of deepening democratic culture and norms in Zambia. In addition, USAID will explore options for continuing mid-career training for independent journalists through the Zambia Institute for Mass Communication. A new activity will be initiated in support of the judiciary, which along with civil society NGOs and parts of the private press has emerged as a pillar of democratic values.

The SO 4 Results Framework:

- IR 4.1 Strengthened Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights
 - IR 4.1.1 Improved Legal Framework for More Effective Functioning of Free Markets
 - IR 4.1.2 Improved Administration of Justice
- IR 4.2 More Competitive Political Process
 - IR 4.2.1 Better-Informed Parliamentary Process
 - IR 4.2.2 Accurate News Media Reporting on Issues of the Public Interest
 - IR 4.2.3 Effective Advocacy by Civil Society Organizations Representing Diverse Interests
 - IR 4.2.4 Citizen Awareness of the Relevance of Democratic Governance to Basic Needs
- IR 4.3 More Transparent and Accountable Government Institutions
 - IR 4.3.1 Improved Administration, Planning, and Budgeting

ANNEX 2: PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THE ZAMBIA CASE STUDY

Within the USAID Mission

Robert Clay, Population, Health, and Nutrition Officer
Susan Gale, Private Sector Project Manager
Kamau Lizwelicha, Controller
Morse Nanchengwa, Agricultural Specialist
Walter North, Director of the USAID Mission in Zambia
Watae Sidney, Democracy and Governance Specialist
David Soroko, Agriculture Development Officer
Gail Spence, Project Development Officer
Miles Toder, Democratic Governance Advisor
Curt Wolters, Supervisory Program Officer
Paul Zeitz, Senior Policy and Technical Advisor, PHN

Outside of the USAID Mission

Debora Bickel, Country Director, Project Concern International
Richard Holloway, PACT Country Representative to Zambia
Brenda Liswanisa, PACT Zambia
Kevin McCort, Country Director, CARE Zambia
Brendan McGrath, National Programme Coordinator, Urban Community Programme, Irish Aid Klaus Mitzlaff, Zambia Director, German Development Corporation
Siv Catherine Moe, Second Secretary Political and Economic Affairs, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Jackie Peace, Zambia Deputy Director, The British Council
Sogunro Remi, Chief of Party BASICS, Child Survival
Arlene Render, United States Ambassador to Zambia
Robie Siammwiza, Technical Advisor Policy, Project Concern International to Zambia
Robin Yeager, Deputy Director, USIS Zambia

ANNEX 3: EXAMPLES OF USAID/ZAMBIA SYNERGIES

At the activity level there are four ongoing DG initiatives in Zambia that would be considered cross-cutting in nature. (This section is based on comments submitted by Miles Todder, the USAID/Zambia DG advisor.)

1. *Parliamentary Strengthening:* As part of USAID/Zambia's Parliamentary Strengthening Program the Mission is working together with the Norway Agency for International Development's institution strengthening project with the Auditor General of Zambia (AG)—the investigatory arm of parliament—to be able to more effectively investigate and uncover the improper use of public funds. This will support the Parliament's desire to play a more effective “watchdog role” over the executive and also assist in the fight against corruption. In particular, with support from the Regional Inspector General in Pretoria and in coordination with the Mission's controller's office, USAID/Zambia is building capacity to contract for and oversee audits of U.S. government funds. The Mission is assisting the Auditor General to audit the use of funds from the PHN program to assist with the recently concluded International Conference on AIDS and STDs in Africa. DG resources have been used for AG staff training in USG audit requirements as well as to cover costs of outsourcing audit work to private sector firms. The controller's office has assisted primarily with the formulation of terms of reference and the tendering and contracting of audit services—areas in which they have considerable experience and expertise. There has also been good cooperation with the AG's office in finalizing a potentially contentious audit of a previously completed high profile multi-donor DG activity to support the work of the Constitutional Review Commission from 1995 to 1996.
2. *Decentralization:* As part of USAID/Zambia's assistance for greater decentralization of governance, the Mission has used DG resources and combined this with assistance from the Leland Initiative to access the information the public health system. Decentralization of line-ministry operations has and still remains as probably the best chance for a progressive shift of responsibility, authority, and the necessary resources to levels of government where services are delivered and that are closest to citizen-customers. In critical service areas of health and education, it makes good sense to use the Mission's DG resources to improve key aspects of public administration and governance to put into practice the various concepts and principles that constitute the notion of democratic governance.
3. *Administration of Justice:* Toward improving the administration of justice, the DG Team has embarked on a cooperative effort with the Economic Growth and Privatization strategic objective team to remove an important and debilitating obstacle to private sector led economic growth: the enforcement of commercial and other cases. With the courts badly overcrowded with commercial and other cases, the Mission has combined USAID privatization funds with DG design, management, and monitoring to put in place the necessary pieces of commercial arbitration system. In a combined effort between USAID and the International Trade Center of UNCTAD/WTO, the Law Association of Zambia has been given a USAID grant along with technical assistance through the Forum for International Commercial Arbitration, a private foundation. Already, the second class

of Zambian arbitrators have been accredited; a new draft arbitration act modeled on the UNCITRAL example has been formulated and given to government, the judiciary, and the business community; regional ties have been established with neighboring arbitration and ADR initiatives and organizations including several international institutions; and work has started on organizing both a professional association of arbitrators and an administrative center to manage the process.

4. *Rule of Law:* In terms of strengthening the rule of law, USAID/Zambia has used a DHRF grant to the judiciary to support a series of seminars, mostly in the Northern Province, to familiarize magistrates and judges with the rights of women and children. This has become increasingly more important in light of the high death rates from HIV/AIDS and the tendency toward “property grabbing” by relatives to the detriment of surviving wives and their children. The DG team is considering proposals from the Mission’s cross-sectoral Widows and Orphans Task Force to expand this training of judges of the high court and government prosecutors on inheritance law to combat the property grabbing phenomena. This would help in addressing problems of orphans and widow and compliment the Mission’s PHN activities targeting the effects of HIV/AIDS in Zambia.

ANNEX 4: DOCUMENTS CONSULTED IN THE ZAMBIA CASE STUDY

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